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Three types of representations in the philosophy of computer science

ABSTRACT. This paper is devoted to the role that the notion of representation plays in the philosophy of computer science. The analysis that is presented here uses the classic

division of symbolic representations, indices and icons, as proposed by C.S. Peirce. The author of this paper argues that, although it is referred to in the literature most often, the first type of representations can be safely eliminated from the discipline. However, the second and third types have important applications in the philosophy of computer science.

KEY WORDS: representations, philosophy of computer science, s-representations, symbolic representations, indices

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