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## **O roli prawdy w filozofii i nauce Czy możliwa jest ekonomia bez prawdy?**

**ABSTRACT.** On the Role of Truth in Philosophy and in Science. Is Economics Without the Truth Possible?

Central role of truth as a goal or as a regulative idea to any scientific activity is rather non-problematic even in nowadays scientific discourse. In this article, however – completely contrary to this “discursive consensus” – we, first of all, try to defend the thesis that this situation cannot be treated as a „natural state” but is an effect of – specific for western civilization – tradition and construction of language. Secondly, we argue that differences among different concepts of truth on a very general level could be reduced to on scheme which J. Mitterer called dualistic way of thinking. Thirdly, we show that alternative way of philosophical thinking and in consequence different approach to the problem of scientific knowledge is not only possible, but was and still is present in western culture. Finally, by analyzing one of the main methodological concepts present in contemporary economics (M. Friedman’s „methodology of positive economics”), by indicating its most spectacular theoretical application (G. Becker’s economic theory of social behavior) and by discussing M. Callon’s concept of performativity of economics, we try to explain how this alternative “non-truth” philosophy “works” and why it could be seen as more heuristically promising.

**KEY WORDS:** truth, philosophy of economics, performativity of economics

### **1. Prawda jako idea regulatywna dyskursu naukowego**

Stwierdzenie, iż w dyskursie naukowym i akademickim prawda zajmuje centralną pozycję, jest właściwie truizmem. Ta swego rodzaju „dyskursywna oczywistość” jest tożsama nie tylko z uznaniem, że stanowi ona podstawowe kryterium waloryzacji wszelkiego rodzaju dokonań już w tymże dyskursie obecnych, ale wręcz z przekonaniem, iż sytuacja, w której mógłby on funkcjonować bez teźże prawdy w ogóle (choćby tylko