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On Analogical Concepts (Transcendentalia)[1]

ABSTRACT. The adjective "transcendental" has two different meanings. In Kant's philosophy, it means "transcending all possible experience". It is an epistemological meaning. The method of transcendental deduction was proposed by Kant to cope with problems of *quid juris* in our concepts. Quite another sense of the adjective "transcendental" was (and still is) associated with scholastic (neo-scholastic) philosophy. The schoolmen say *ens omnia genera transcendit*. It means that the concept of being is transcategorial, where "categorical" refers to categories in Aristotle's understanding. One theory of transcendentalia, developed in the most mature form by Thomas Aquinas, distinguished several transcendental concepts, in particular, the mentioned *ens*, further, *verum* (truth), *bonum* (goodness), *res* (thing), *aliquid* (something), *unum* (unity) and, sometimes, *pulchrum* (beauty).
The theory of *transcendentalia* leads to many interesting logical and ontological problems which can be analyzed by tools derived from logic and set theory. Clearly, *ens* is the most important transcendental concept. Is the collection of beings a set or a proper class? Or perhaps a category in the mathematical sense? Other question pertain to truth. Is it ontological or epistemological concept? How to interpret the idea that the essence of truth consists in a correspondence of truth-bearers and the reality? As far as the issue concern *bonum*, is it really co-extensional with *ens* and *verum*? The paper tries to answer these questions.

KEY WORDS: analogy, transcendetalia, Kant, Aquinas, Scotus

The adjective 'transcendental' has two basically different meanings, both of a very deep philosophical relevance. In Kant's critical philosophy, it means the same as the phrase 'transcending all possible experience'.[2] This sense is almost exclusively associated with epistemological issues. In

[1] I use in this essay some material published in my earlier papers [Woleński, 1992], [Woleński, 1997], [Woleński, 2004, repr. in: Woleński, 2011], [Woleński, 2008, repr. in: Woleński, 2011], [Woleński, 2013].

[2] The meaning of 'analogical' in this context will be explained below.

particular, Kant proposed the method of transcendental deduction in order to cope with the problems of *quid juris* (that is the possibility of the justification of synthetic a priori propositions) in our knowledge, different than empirical *questiones facti*. Quite another sense of the adjective 'transcendental' and more related to ontology than to epistemology is associated with scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy.[3] The Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of general concepts, namely, universals and transcendental concepts.[4] Roughly speaking, the former express Aristotelian secondary substances. The later are the most general notions. They include *ens* (being), *verum* (truth) and *bonum* (goodness), *unum* (one) and *res* (thing).[5] The concept of being plays a special role among all transcendental concepts, because other transcendentalia are compared to it.

The fundamental principle proposed for transcendentals is captured by the following formula:

(*) If *T* and *T'* are transcendentals, both are mutually convertible.[6]

The following more concrete asertions instantiate (*):

(a) *Ens et verum convertuntur* (being and truth are mutually convertible);

(b) *Ens et bonum convertuntur* (being and goodness are mutually convertible);

(c) *Verum et bonum convertuntur* (truth and goodness are mutually convertible);

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[3] It is important to note that 'transcendental' and 'transcendent' are sometimes employed as synonyms, like in the sentences 'God is transcendental' and 'God is transcendent'. On the other hand, if we consider the sentence 'The object of knowledge is transcendent with respect to the knowing subject', the word 'transcendent' points out that the object in question exists outside of the subject (is not immanent) and suggests the thesis of metaphysical realism. In order to avoid a confusion, I will avoid the adjective 'transcendent' in my further considerations.

[4] For historical accounts, see [Knittermeyer, 1920; Schulemann, 1929; Wotler, 1946; Bärthlein, 1972; Elders, 1992; Aertsen, 1996, 2012].

[5] Sometimes *pulchrum* (beauty) is posited as a transcendentalium, but I do not follow this view, because it is controversial. In particular, beauty and ugliness are frequently considered as subjective.

[6] The account of transcendentals based on (*) I will label as the (*)-theory.

(d) *Ens et unum convertuntur* (being and unity are mutually convertible);
(e) *Unum et verum convertuntur* (unity and truth are mutually convertible);
(f) *Unum et bonum convertuntur* (unity and goodness are mutually convertible);
(g) *Ens et res convertuntur* (being and thing are mutually convertible);
(h) *Res et verum convertuntur* (thing and truth are mutually convertible);
(i) *Res et bonum convertuntur* (thing and good are mutually convertible).

Using other terminology, we can say that transcendentals are extensionally equivalent, but intensionally different. The second clause means that properties expressed by 'is a being', 'is true' and 'is good' are not the same. Since being plays the special role in the variety of transcendentalia, one can say that others are modes (aspects) of being (*modi entis*).

To anticipate further remarks, I note two circumstances. Firstly, transcendental concepts are predicated not univocally on things (particular beings), but analogically.[7] Secondly, we should expect some logical peculiarities of transcendentalia. One such peculiarity can be easily derived from the fact that transcendental concepts are the most general notions. They cannot be defined by *genus proximum et differentiam specificam.* Assume that *U* is a universal. Thus, we can define *U* as *U'DF*, where *U'* is the nearest more general universal and *DF* is a specific difference. For instance, we define a square as a rectangle having equal sides. Following the traditional account we say that *U* is a specialization of *U*', but the latter is a generalization of the former. Consequently, being is not a specialization of anything else and, on the other hand, it is not a generalization of universals. Moreover, if *U* (for instance, a square) is a universal, not-*U*

[7] The qualification 'analogically' justifies the title of this paper. Analogical concepts are related to the idea of the analogy of being (*analogia entis*). Roughly speaking, *analogia entis* consists in coexistence with various transcendental aspects of being, which determines its essence. See [Przywara, 2014], for a comprehensive analysis of the problem of the variety of problems associated with the analogy of being.

(a not-square) is universal as well. We say that not-*U* is formed by the *infinitatio* of *U*, the operation performed by adding 'not' before *U*. Clearly, transcendentals do not admit *infinitatio*. In particular, 'not-being' does not refer to anything; it is not even an empty name, because it is not a name at all and functions as a syntacategorem in contradistinction to 'being', a categorematic expression. 'Not-being' has to be distinguished from the phrase 'false (wrong, etc.) being' in which the adjectiveacts as a modifier, that is, changes the meaning of the word 'being'. These peculiarities are well summarized by the formula *ens omnia genera transcendent* (being transcends all genera). The same concerns other transcendentals. In what follows, I will concentrate onbeing and goodness.

The (*)-theory of transcendental concepts was extensively developed by Thomas Aquinas and his later philosophical followers. It is one of the very foundations of the old and present Thomistic philosophy in all of its domains, namely, ontology, epistemology and axiology, particularly the negative theory of *malum* (moral wrongness or moral evil), which will be analyzed in the second part of this paper . Duns Scotus proposed a different theory of transcendental concepts.[8] He distinguished so-called disjunctive transcendentals, such as necessity and possibility/contingency, which do not satisfy (*) and transcendendalia which obey this principle. Necessity and contingency are examples of the disjunctive transcendental. As an important consequence of Scotus' account we have that disjunctive transcendental concepts do not belong to the most general concepts. This is so, because being can be either necessary or possible (contingent). Since being can be necessary (like Platonic forms or God in various religions) or contingent (as the world created by God or things in Plato's ontology), neither necessity nor contingency are co-extensional with the concept of being. If *T'* is a disjunctive transcendental, not-*T''* is a disjunctive transcendental as well. This entails that if *T* is one of the most general transcendental concepts, that is, the notion of being and its extensional equivalents (for instance, truth in Scotus's account) its scope is the sum of *T'* and *T''*.

[8] I use the terms 'transcendentalia', 'transcendentals' and 'transcendental concepts' interchangeably.

A particularly good account of the (*)-theory is captured by the following quotation (the author of this passage omits *res*):[9]

> There are some features which belong to every being *qua* being without any exception and, for this reason they are called transcendental. They are also labeled transcendental significations. Actually they refer to that which is defined more closely as the transcendental concept of being and point out some real mode of being which, independently of of our mind, is associated with every being. This mode is logically different from every being and it is not expressed by the concept of being. Finally, we often call these features transcendental properties, at the same time the term "property" (*proprietas*) is taken in a wider meaning. A property in the strict sense is that which necessarily belongs to the essence and makes it distinct from other essences, though it is not comprised by it.. On the other hand, transcendental properties add nothing and even they cannot add anything, because being, as we know comprises everything that can exist in any way, they only formally indicate some perfection which is *implicite* contained in every being. […]. […] these properties associated with every being are predicated about various things similarly as being, that is, analogically. […]. We have three transcendental properties of being: unity, truth and goodness. In other words: every being is one, true and good. […]. [B]eing can be considered either as existing in itself or related to something else. In the first case, we have indivisibility that is unity of being. In the second case, we have either truth or goodness.

It is perhaps interesting to note that the transcendentals *res* and *unum* determine the so-called distributive conception of being on which 'being' is a general term referring to particularia and their properties (secondary substances) as possibly separated ontological items, but this word does not designate the collective (mereological) whole consisting of connected parts.[10]

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[9] [Wais, 1926, pp. 77-78]. Kazimierz Wais was an important representative of Neo-Scholasticism in Poland in the early 20th century.

[10] There are also attempts to analyze the concept of being as mereological. See [Henry, 1972], for this way of thinking about the concept of being. The difference between the distributive and collective account of the concept of being is substantial, because different formal tools are involved in both conceptions. Whereas the former conception employs predicate logic and set theory, the latter theory is based on mereology as the theory of the parthood relation. It is obvious that the issue how to analyze the concept of being is related to other basic philosophical controversies. For instance, the choice of a formal basis for ontological analysis has obvious affinities with a preference toward nominalism or conceptual realism.

What is the analogical mode of predication? If the transcendentals are the most general properties, you cannot imagine more general ones (it is a consequence of the formula *ens omnia genera transcendit*). Putting this in other words, the concept of being does not arise by a specialization of any other notion (see above). Hence, nothing more general can be predicated about particular beings. The tacit assumption is here that a normal predication (I recall that the transcendentalia are *proprietates* in a wider meaning) adds something to what is predicated about. According to the Schoolmen and their followers, only universals allow increasing their contents by adding new properties. This mode is characterized as univocal. On the other hand, the analogical mode is not ambiguous, that is, it does not produce new meanings via its applications to different particular cases, but it points out that the transcendentals are predicated on everything in the same way. Let me return to the remarks on 'false being'. On the other hand, 'true' in 'true being' (similarly, in the case of other transcendental significations) adds nothing to the meaning of the name 'being'. It is a very instructive feature of analogical predication about beingand other transcendentalia as well.[11] In what follows, some peculiarities of the transcendental concepts will be more closely analyzed by contemporary logical tools.[12] In particular, I will try to clarify the concept of being (as understood in the (*)-theory) by predicate logic and set theory, and to show that goodness should be considered as a disjunctive transcendental, not as one of the transcendentals co-extensive with being.[13]

We can illustrate the (*)-theory by the following scheme (it is the first approximation):

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[11] Note, however, that Duns Scotus considered all trancendentals as predicated univocally. This view is closely related to the fact that we have not only transcendentals as the most general concepts, but also disjunctive ones.

[12] This kind of analysis directed to ideas proposed by the Schoolmen has a long tradition in Poland. See [Woleński, 2003, repr. in: Woleński, 2013]. In particular, Salamucha considered the transcendental as a systematically ambiguous concept in the sense of logical types. See [Salamucha, 2003, 71-95 (originally published in Polish in 1937)].

[13] The same concerns truth. See [Woleński, 2013] (see note 1) for an analysis of truth as a transcendentalium. Speaking more precisely, this conclusion concerns truth in the epistemological sense.

(S) *Ens qua ens*
Various universals (*ens in alio*)
Individuals (*ens per se*)

First of all, the contexts *ens per se* and *ens per alio* must be properly understood. The phrases *per se* and *in alio* do not express properties of being as being (*ens qua ens*) but rather conveniently characterize individuals as members of a set of beings (primary substances in Aristotle's view) and universals as universals belonging to the set of secondary substances. In fact, we can skip the expressions *ens per se* and *ens in alio* without any loss of content.

Since universals are hierarchically ordered by their generality, we can replace (S) by

(S1) *Ens*

Universals_n
Universals_{n-1}
……
Universals_1

Individuals

The scheme (S1) has two peculiar (or critical) points, namely Individuals and *Ens* (it is symbolized by the line -----). Individuals cannot be defined by *genus proximum et diffrentiam specificam*, because definitions (according to the traditional logic) concern general names (concepts). Thus, individuals are subjected neither to generalization nor to specialization. We should rather say that they instantiate universals of the order 1 (that is, covered by Universals_1) and are collected in sets of items having properties expressed by universals located at the level 1. As we know, *Ens* does not admit generalization. Its specialization is a delicate problem and I will not enter into this question. Perhaps we might say that Individuals and Universals instantiate *Ens* in the way determined by the analogical use

of transcendental concepts. Finally, the hierarchy H = {Individuals, Universals$_1$, Universals$_2$, …, Universals$_{n-1}$, Universals$_n$} is finite.[14]

Now I will pass on to approaches motivated by modern logic and set theory. At first I consider the scheme:

(S2)
$$\frac{F^e(Ens)}{\begin{array}{c}\ldots\ldots\\ F^n(F^{n-1})\\ F^{n-1}(F^{n-2})\\ \ldots\ldots\\ F^1(x)\end{array}}$$
$$a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_{n-1}, a_n, \ldots$$

This scheme present a linguistic hierarchy of formulas (H^{S2}). We have the 0 of individual constants, that is, the individual names of objects.[15] The formulas of the 1st order express properties of the individuals, that is, items denoted by individuals constants. The formulas of the n^{th} order express the properties denoted by the formulas of the n–1 order. Although the hierarchy H^{S2} is infinite, one can also consider its finite fragments.

A special problem pertains to the formulas falling under $F^e(Ens)$. First of all, the expression *Ens* is a constant. Assuming, as it was noted, the distributive conception of being, *Ens* is a collection of all the possible items deserving to be covered by the constant *Ens*. However, it does not

[14] Although I exclude *Ens* from the hierarchy *H*, the opposite standpoint can be adopted. My reason for the exclusion in question will be given soon.

[15] I make some simplifications. I include individual constants into formulas. According to the standard account, the set formulas consists of sentences and sentential open formulas. I consider only monadic formulas. Thus, the letter F^n expresses a property of the *nth* order. Nothing essentially changes if formulas express *n*-termed ($n \leq 2$). I illustrate levels of the hierarchy H^{S2} by open formulas. Thus, sentences obtained by the quantification of open formulas or the substitution of variables by constants in open formulas are skipped. Finally, the expression $F^n(\ldots)$ represents, not a single formula, but a possibly infinite stock of formulas of the *nth* order.

say very much about the character of the formula F^e(*Ens*). Clearly, if one intends to follow the theory of transcendentals, the predicate F^e cannot express a property of being, unless we assume that it would be a property in a wider sense, more specifically, predicated about *Ens* analogically. The peculiarity of F^e decides that the index e is not a possible value of n in F^n, but rather an indicator that the related predicate is closely related to *Ens.* However, these explanations can be hardly considered as the ultimate clarification of the discussed issues.

If we inspect the description of (S2) and H^{S2}, we immediately realize that several statements about both constructions also appeal to references of individuals constants and predicates. This circumstance motivates the scheme:

(S3) *Ens*

……

$\text{Sets}^n(S^{n-1})$

$\text{Sets}^{n-1}(S^{n-2})$

……

Sets^1(individuals)

Individuals

$i_1, i_2, \ldots, i_{n-1}, i_n, \ldots$

(S3) presents a set-theoretical hierarchy H^{S3}. Its lowest level consists of a possibly infinite stock of individuals. The level marked by 1 covers a set of individuals, the level 2 – sets of sets of individuals and so on.[16] Finally, we can say that (S2) is intensional in its character, but (S3) extensional. It corresponds with the intuition that although transcendentals are mutually convertible from the extensional point of view, they are either being or express various aspects of *Ens*.

[16] (S3) and H^{S3} can be further simplified by adopting the principle that everything (up to the index n) is a set. This move cancels individuals. However, it seems that (S3) is philosophically more plausible than the hierarchy consisting exclusively of sets.

One point is, however, not captured by (S3). We do not know whether *Ens* is a set or something else. The negative answer is straightforward. If *Ens* would be a set, the predicate F^e would express a property (in the strict sense) of being. Yet this account contradicts earlier statements on being. Thus, we must look for a different interpretation of *Ens* in the set-theoretical setting. Fortunately, set theory provides a simple account of the status of *Ens* as an object. This solution consists in understanding the entity *Ens* asa proper class, not a set.[17] Intuitively speaking, a proper class is too big in order to be a set. The set of all sets is an example of a proper class. The naïve principle of comprehension states that every property determines a set. Putting this in other words, if *P* is a property, all objects having this property constitute a set. We can also say that if *F* is a predicate, all objects satisfying the formula *Fx* ('*x* is *F*') constitute a set. The axiomatic set theory introduces the restricted comprehension axiom saying that *X* is a set if and only if *X* is a subset of a set. Let *V* be a set of all sets. By Cantor's theorem if *X* is a set, the family of all its subsets is larger than *V*. However, it produces a contradiction, because *V* as the set of all sets is the largest set.[18] A solution is just to consider the universe of all sets as a proper class.

How to apply the concept of the proper class to *Ens*? Since this entity (*Ens*) covers all beings (independently of how being is defined), it can be viewed as a proper class. As we remember, *Ens* cannot be defined by *genus proximum et differentiam specificam.* It constitutes the next analogy. Proper classes also cannot be classically defined. If they were defined by their nearest kind and the specific difference, this way should proceed by

[17] I use ZF (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory with individuals, because it provides the simplest solution and, at least in my opinion, this background is sufficient for philosophy. However, any other system in which the distinction between a set and a proper class holds, can be taken as a formal background. See [Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, 1973], for an extensive presentation of various systems of set theory and their foundational and philosophical problems. Mathematical category theory provides another formal skeleton for an analysis of the concept of being, but I will not discuss this route.

[18] In fact, the motivation for introducing proper classes as different sets came from looking for a solution of set-theoretical paradoxes. Not all proper classes are philosophically interesting. For instance, the Russell class, that is, the class of all classes which are not elements of themselves, important from the point of view of the history of paradox, has no particular philosophical relevance, at least in ontology.

finding a set correlated with the *genus proximum* in question. However, this is impossible, because proper classes cannot be subsets of sets. Furthermore, set-theoretical operations performed on classes must be somehow restricted. This constraint looks similar to the limitations of generalization, specialization and *infinitatio* as applied to *Ens* (and other transcendentalia). Furthermore, we can say that if someone uses the locution 'is a proper class', this way of speaking refers to a property in a wider sense, let's say, a quasi-property. Otherwise speaking, sets correspond to universals, but proper class to transcendentalsI do not say that the above analogies between proper classes as viewed in mathematical set theory and the entity *Ens* solve all, usually very controversial problems concerning the concept of being, in particular, questions raised by the (*)-theory. For instance, it seems that set-theory with proper classes does not provide the resources for a formal analysis of the analogical predication. Eventually, we might say that quasi-properties are those features of proper classes which are established in axiomatic treatments of such entities. For instance, two proper classes are extensionally equivalent if and only if these classes have the same elements. An attempt to construct the axiomatic theory of *Ens* by following some ideas stemming from set-theory with proper classes seems attractive. But even if such a theory is very problematic or even impossible, the idea of proper classes provides an attractive way of treating the concept of being (and other transcendental notions) in formal ontology based on the definite logical and mathematical devices.[19]

I have already mentioned the negative theory of *malum* (**NTM** for brevity). Now I will pass on to its analysis.[20] According to the (*)-theory every being is good and everything what is good is an instance of being. These statements can be rendered more formally as:

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[19] It does not mean that I accept the outlined picture in all its details. For example, I have some nominalistic scruples against an excessive use set theory in ontology. Moreover, I seriously consider the possibility to interpret the word 'being' as a syncategorematic word (see my first paper quoted in note 1). A more detailed discussion of these issues exceeds the scope of this paper.

[20] This part of the present paper follows ideas expressed in my paper "Malum, Transcendentalia and Logic" (see note 1 for bibliographical details) and verbatim repeats some of its fragments.

(**NTM**1) *X* is good if and only if *X* is being.

Consequently, *malum* has a negative character. By transposition, evil is not being and, thereby, does not exist, eventually inside of the human imagination. I will argue than **NTM** is untenable. Firstly, I shall sketch an argumentation against this theory. Secondly, I shall try to outline various possibilities of the ontology of malum. **NTM** has two aspects, theological and ontological. As far as the issue concerns the former, **NTM** serves as a solution of a very celebrated problem of theodicy concerning the (in)consistency between the reality of evil on the one hand, and God's attributes on the other. MI am interested here only in the second, that is ontological problem.

One of the basic questions concerning **NTM** consists in understanding the qualification expressed by the word 'negative' in the frameworks of **NTM**. Clearly, *malum* is somehow opposite to *bonum*. Now 'the opposite' may be understood either as a negativum (contradictory) or as a privativum (contrary). The Schoolmen favoured the second option. The following example clarifies the issue. What is blindness? It is something that we can ascribe to human beings but not to stones or vegetables. Regarding vision as a positivum human beings have as a naturally occurring equipment, blindness appears as the privativum in this case, and non-vision constitutes the respective negativum. Thus, privativa consists in the lacking of respective positiva. It makes no sense, according to the Schoolmen, to say that stones or vegetables are blind, because they are beyond the scope of vision and blindness. At most, we can correctly say that stones or vegetables have no vision. Logically speaking, if *X* is a positivum and *Y* functions as its negativum, both are contradictories, but, related positiva and privativa are contraries. In consequence, we can state the next main thesis of **NTM**, namely:

(**NTM**2) *Malum* is the privativum with respect to *bonum*.

Both (**NM**1) and (NM2) express how *malum* is metaphysically related to *bonum* as one of transcendentalia.

Thomas Aquinas has also offered another account of what is *bonum* and *malum*. It is based on the idea of proper (right, correct, etc.) desire. The main idea is covered by the following equivalence:

(**) *X is* good if and only if it is an object of a proper desire.

Clearly, (**) refers to the psychology of human actions and their ethical consequences. We can say that (**) defines *bonum ethicum.* By a simple logical transformation, we obtain that *X* is *malum ethicum* if and only if there is lack of proper desire, that is, directed to *bonum.* Are *malum* in the sense of (**NTM**2) and *malum* in the sense of (**) coextensive or not? The affirmative answer seems to be motivated by the following (or a similar) example focusing on some commonsensical aspects of evil. Take the case of death. It certainly raises definite associations with non-being (*malum metaphysicum*), the physical privativum of life (*malum physicum*) and raises unpleasant (undesired) ethical feelings (*malum ethicum*). However, we must examine whether there is a logical passing from metaphysical and physical evil to the ethical one.

In the discussed problem, it is not inessential whether we appeal to the distributive or the collective understanding of being. Consider the following statements:

(1) If ***X*** is *bonum*, then ***X*** is everything (the collective interpretation of being);
(2) If ***X*** is everything, then ***X*** is *bonum* (the collective interpretation of being);
(3) If ***X*** is a *bonum*, then ***X*** is an object (the distributive interpretation of being);
(4) If ***X*** is an object, then ***X*** is a *bonum* (the distributive interpretation of being).

Now if we take being (the being) in the collective interpretation, (1) and (2) trivially imply that *malum* is negative. One can also argue that being is good as a whole, although some of its parts instantiate evil. Thus, the collective theory of being does not help very much in interpreting **NTM.** It is at most a metaphysical construction without particularly inter-

esting consequences. More relevant is the distributive conception of being (*X* is an object, a being) and it is this line I will take. Now (4) is problematic, because we do not know why being *qua* being has an ethical qualification *per se.* On the other hand, (3) expresses an obvious but trivial truth: if something is good, it must be something. However, (1) as I have noted, is not so simple. Returning to (4), which is absolutely crucial for **NTM,** one can argue that:

(5) if ***X*** is an object, then ***X*** is good or wrong.

And (5) seems more intuitive, because people rather agree that some things or actions are wrong. In what follows, I shall argue that there are also other possibilities.

Let me come back to the problem of a logical connection between sentences asserting that something is an object and that it has an ethical qualification. It is clear that:

(6) every object is *bonum metaphysicum*,

does not entails

(7) every object is properly desirable,

unless we stipulate otherwise. In fact, common intuitions seem to support:

(8) if ***X*** is properly desirable, ***X*** is an object.

If we accept (8) and the Hume thesis that assertions on what is do not entail ought-sentences, we are entitled to say that there is no logical connection betweenthe sentences '*X* is an object' and '*X* is desired' because the former does not imply the latter; the reverse connection can be eventually posited (see (8)). So any theory of *bonum* and *malum* based on the convertibility thesis (that is, the (*)-theory) is either axiologically sterile (that is, does not entail any moral consequences) or is committed to the naturalistic fallacy consisting in deriving *bonum ethicum* from *bonum*

metaphysicum.[21] This suffices to say that (*) and (NM2), both reformulated with respect to malum, are not equivalent. This means that '*malum* is the privativum of *bonum*' and '*malum* is what is the lack of proper desire' are not equivalent.

However, **NTM** is not the only solution. Another is provided by the disjunctive theory of transcendentals. It was improved by Tadeusz Czeżowski.[22] He distinguished the transcendentals in the sense of (*) and modal transcendentalia. *Ens* belongs to the first group, but possibility, necessity and ethical values are among modal transcendentals. The nature of modal transcendentals is this. Here is an explanation of modal transcendentalia:

> Necessity, possibility [..] and values are [...] asserted in propositions. They do not belong to descriptions of objects and they do not determine universals describing those objects. They denote, in contradistinction to properties which universals refer to, so-called *modi entis*, i. e. ways of being of objects. These ways of being determine whether objects have properties, because only existing objects have properties, as well as how objects have properties: necessarily, possibly, accidentally or in such a way that they are valuable, good or beautiful [Czeżowski, 1977, p. 55].

Modal transcendentals are asserted in related modal propositions of the type:

(9) (a) it is good that *A*;

(b) it is wrong that *A*.

The modal character of *bonum* and *malum* transformed into operators 'it is good that' and 'it is wrong that' suggests the following logical diagram (D):

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[21] *Bonum metaphysicum* is only a label for *ens* and has no ethical connotations unless one decides that *ensqua ens* has an intristic ethical qualification. Moreover, there is no passing from desire to proper desire.

[22] [Czeżowski, 1977].



This diagram covers logical relations between the sentences: α – it is good that *A*, β – it is wrong that *A*, γ – it is not wrong that *A*, δ – it is not good that not-*A*), ν – is it is good or wrong that *A*, μ – it is not good that *A* and it is not wrong that *A* (it is neither good nor wrong that *A*; it is indifferent that *A*), κ – *A*, λ – not-*A*. not good that *A*). Good and wrong are considered here as axiological modalities, which have an analogical logic to deontic logic. In particular, we have the following dependencies (I neglect here reductions via interdefinability, for example 'it is wrong that *A*' is equivalent to 'it is not good that not-*A*').

(10) $\neg(\alpha\wedge\beta)$;
(11) $(\alpha\Rightarrow\gamma)$;
(12) $(\beta\Rightarrow\delta)$;

(13) $\neg(\kappa \Rightarrow \alpha)$ (the Hume thesis for goodness);
(14) $\neg(\lambda \Rightarrow \beta)$ (the Hume thesis for evil);
(15) $\neg(\alpha \Rightarrow \kappa)$ (the converse of the Hume thesis for goodness);
(16) $\neg(\beta \Rightarrow \lambda)$ (the converse of the Hume thesis for evil);
(17) $(\alpha \Leftrightarrow \neg\delta)$;
(18) $(\beta \Leftrightarrow \neg\gamma)$;
(19) $(\nu \Leftrightarrow \neg\mu)$;
(20) $(\mu \Rightarrow \gamma)$;
(21) $(\mu \Rightarrow \delta)$;
(22) $(\alpha \vee \beta \vee \gamma)$.

The formulas (10)–(22) have the following informal translations: no object is simultaneously good and wrong (10); if an object is good, it is not wrong (11); if an object is wrong, it is not good (12); it is not the case, that if an object is, it is good (13); it is not the case, that if an object is, it is wrong (14); it is not the case, that if an object is good, it is (15); it is not the case, that if an object is wrong, it is not (16); an object is good if and only if it is not wrong (17); an object is wrong if and only if it is not good (18); an object is indifferent if and only if it is neither good nor wrong (19); if an object is indifferent, it is not good (20); if an object is indifferent, it is not wrong (21); every object is good or wrong or indifferent (22).

Assuming (D) all the formulas (10)–(22) express logical truths. On the other hand, it is not true about the statements (I slightly change the notation):

(23) every object is good; $\forall x\alpha(x)$;
(24) every object is wrong;$\forall x\beta(x)$;
(25) every object is good or wrong: $\forall x(\alpha(x) \vee \beta(x))$;
(26) every object is indifferent; $\forall x\mu(x)$;
(27) some objects are good, some wrong, some indifferent; $\exists x\alpha(x) \wedge \exists x\beta(x) \wedge \exists x\mu(x)$.

The formulas (23)-(27) express some possibilities of how *bonum* and *malum* are distributed over being in the distributive understanding. Any

theory which adopts (11)–(22) can be regarded as a formal ontology of *bonum* and *malum*. If someone chooses one of (23)–(27) as the thesis about the world, one offers a material (or metaphysical) theory of values.

We have the following possible material distributions of *bonum* and *malum*:

(I) radical ontological ethism (ontological pantethism) with three special instances:
  (a) monism of *bonum* – the thesis (23);
  (b) monism of *malum* – the thesis (24);
  (c) dualism of *bonum* and *malum* – the thesis (25);
(II) ethical ontological indifferentism – the thesis (26);
(III) moderate ontological ethism – the thesis (27).

Pantheism says that every object is ethically valuable. More specifically, (Ia) asserts that only goodness can exist (this is simply a version of **NTM**), (Ib) – that only evil can exist (Schopenhauer's view), and (Ic) – that both goodness and evil can exist together (the manicheism of *bonum* and *malum*). Moderate ontological ethism says that there are valuable (good or wrong) as well as ethically indifferent objects. This view seems to be closely related to the ordinary account concerning the distribution of ethical values over objects. Finally, ethical ontological indifferentism considers being as ethically indifferent. This entails that *bonum* and *malum* are ontologically indistinguishable (this is a typical positivistic view) without recurring to human evaluations. Now we can see that **NTM** is committed to the naturalistic fallacy in the sense of G. E. Moore. The next weak point of this theory consists in confusing formal ontology and metaphysics (or material ontology), because it considers (Ia) as a necessary statement. I tried to show that this elevating of a pure ontological possibility to the rank of the only material necessity is illegitimate. Finally, **NTM** expresses an ethical optimism, Schopenhaurianism provides an example of ethical pessimism, and moderate ontological ethism is, as I already noted, close to common sense. However, **NTM** and Schopenhauer's view on human nature are based on very general and strong metaphysical assumptions, but not on real human experiences.

The modal theory of transcendentals leaves open the status of values. It can be combined with the view that they are actual properties of objects as well as with the position that *bonum* and *malum* rather are the results of valuations stemming from human special (for example, emotive) experiences. Speaking more specifically, the modal theory of ethical transcendentals can be developed into naturalism, intuitionism, emotivism, subjectivism, objectivism, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, etc. This generality of the account based on (D) provides an additional evidence that we should distinguish not only the level of formal ontology and the level of metaphysics in the analysis of values, but also accommodate in our general scheme various proposals belonging to so called philosophy of value. This way of thinking about axiological matters, originated with Hume and continued by Kant, replaced the older purely ontological approach. The proposal based on (D) discussed in this paper partially comes back to ontologism, but tries to embed it in a broader perspective, which is free of various *a priori* prejudices.

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