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## Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on the Analogy of Being

[...] *nicht nur Herr des Seins,  
sondern auch des Sinnes*

Edith Stein

[...] πάντα ἐστὶν ὡς πάντων αἴτιος

Dionysius the Areopagite<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT.** The purpose of my reflection is to explain Edith Stein's phenomenological interpretation of the *analogia entis* (the analogy of being). Her work on analogy is an example of the dual purpose of her philosophical endeavor to "search for the meaning of being" and to "fuse Medieval thought with the lively thought of today", whereby she was referring to her two "masters" Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Husserl.<sup>2</sup> She received her early training from Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, and later immersed herself in the thought of St. Thomas. She set out her views on analogy in her major work, *Finite and Eternal Being*, written in the mid 1930s, engaging the studies of Neo-Thomists Erich Przywara and Joseph Gredt. I believe that Stein's original insights, deeply rooted in theological and philosophical traditions, have a contribution to make to recent "lively" discussions of the analogy (of which *The First World Congress on Analogy* is an example).

**KEY WORDS:** analogy, *analogia entis*, proportionality, Edith Stein, Thomas Aquinas, phenomenology

<sup>1</sup> Stein: God is "lord not only of being but of meaning", [*Endliches und ewiges Sein* (hereafter "EES"), p. 100]. Dionysius: God "as cause is everything", *De divinis nominibus* 5, quoted by St. Thomas in the *Summa theologica* (afterwards "ST") 1:14:2. All English translations are by W. Redmond (*Sein* and *esse* are rendered by "being"; *Seiendes* by "be-ing"); references are to German pagination.

<sup>2</sup> "[...] weil Beides – das Suchen nach dem Sinn des Seins und das Bemühen um eine Verschmelzung von mittelalterlichem Denken mit dem lebendigen Denken der Gegenwart – [...] ihr persönliches Anliegen ist", [EES, p. 3].

## Analogy

Analogy has been discussed throughout the history of philosophy and explained and applied in a number of ways. It received its classical statement in the Middle Ages from Thomas Aquinas and from John Duns Scotus, and was later “commented on” by Cajetan (Thomas de Vio) and others in Renaissance Scholasticism and more recently by Neo-Scholastics like Przywara, Gredt – and Edith Stein herself.<sup>3</sup>

The basic question is how – or whether – we may validly use the same names of both God and creatures. The approach is then linguistic (about *words*), but also noetic (about *concepts*) and ontological (about the analogy of *being*). The traditional phrase “analogy of being” (which, incidentally, St. Thomas does not use) is somewhat misleading, since God, besides “being”, has many “divine names” or “perfections” such as aliveness and wisdom. Both Thomas and Stein wish to focus on *meaning* (*Sinn, ratio*).

Traditionally, a term is said to be *univocal* when used of several things in the same sense. A term not so used, is either *equivocal* (where the ambiguity is *a casu*, “by chance”, like the Latin “*gallus*” which refers either to a rooster or a Frenchman) or *analogous* (where the ambiguity is *a consilio*, “by choice”). The philosophical problem is that if we reject univocal and equivocal statements about God (intending perhaps to avoid pantheism and agnosticism) we must define analogy very carefully indeed, since it seems that it must fit between the horns of an exclusive disjunction.

## Edith Stein

Edith Stein was born in 1891 in Breslau, now in Poland but then a part of Germany. She was brought up in a religious Jewish home but lost her faith as a young girl. She majored in psychology in the University of Breslau, but soon gave up in frustration at what she saw as a lack of clear basic

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<sup>3</sup> Husserl said of Stein: “I do not believe that the church has any Neo-Scholastic of Edith Stein’s caliber”; [Posselt, 2005, p. 154].

principles. She then found in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901) – and in his intention to “go back to things (*Sachen*)” – the “clarification of concepts” that she was seeking. She began her doctoral studies under Husserl in 1913 at the University of Göttingen, where she became a member of the circle of “early phenomenologists” with Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Theodor and Hedwig Conrad-Martius.

Stein accompanied Husserl to the University of Freiburg when he accepted a position there; after receiving her doctorate (1916) she worked for a while as his assistant. In the meantime she and other disciples of Husserl had become disappointed by the apparent “transcendental idealism” they found in his work *Ideas* (1913). Husserl, it seemed to her, had not, in fact, “gone back to things”, and she later wrote a careful critique of Husserl's position in her post-doctoral dissertation *Potency and Act* (1931).<sup>4</sup>

Stein's search for “things” – “objectivity” (*Sachlichkeit*) – was allied with her search for God. In 1921, while staying with friends at a country house, she was profoundly moved reading the autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila. After she finished the book she said: “this is truth”, and decided at once to enter the Catholic church.

She then taught for ten years at a college for young women in Speir, where she was able to absorb Catholic culture: its liturgical, spiritual and intellectual traditions. She was mentored by the prominent Jesuit philosopher Erich Przywara, who commissioned her to translate St. Thomas's *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* into German as well as the letters and journals of the English convert Cardinal Newman.<sup>5</sup> From 1928 to 1932 she lectured widely, especially on education and women's issues, in Germany, Austria, France, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland.

In 1932 Stein accepted a teaching position in the German Institute of Scientific Pedagogy in Münster, but after only two semesters she had to leave when a Nazi law excluded Jews from teaching. The following year she entered the Discalced Carmelite monastery (the order founded by St.

<sup>4</sup> [*Potenz und Akt* (hereafter “PA”), pp. 246-259].

<sup>5</sup> [Stein, 1931-2 and 1928].

Teresa) in Cologne. There she continued her work in philosophy and wrote her major work, *Finite and Eternal Being* between 1935 and 1937). The printing of this book was stopped after a Nazi law forbade the publication of works by Jews; it appeared posthumously in 1951.

To escape persecution Stein went to live in the Carmelite convent in Echt in the Netherlands. But after the Nazi invasion of that country, she was arrested and taken to the concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, where on August 9, 1942, she was murdered in a gas chamber. In 1998 she was canonized by Pope John Paul II.

### Recent controversies over analogy

The last century saw two of the most remarkable debates on analogy since the time of the Renaissance. The first arose within German Christendom in the early 1930s shortly before Edith Stein entered the Carmelite convent. The second developed after the “theological turn” in French phenomenology in the latter part of the last century. Both arose when certain philosophers accused others of debasing God by capturing Him within a univocal notion of being.

Fr. Przywara’s book on analogy, *Analogia entis*, touched off the first debate. Edith Stein was associated with him during the time he was writing this work; she mentioned in the foreword of *Finite and Eternal Being* that both her previous dissertation, *Potency and Act*,

and the final version of his *Analogia entis* were written about the same time, but she was able to look over his earlier drafts. She also carried on a lively exchange of ideas with him between 1925 and 1931, and these conversations likely had a deciding influence on both their approaches to the issues [...] [EES, pp. 4-5].

Przywara’s theory of analogy – which he took to be the basic paradigm of Catholic theology – was angrily repudiated by Swiss Protestant theologian Karl Barth, as “the invention of the Antichrist”, and Barth countered it with his own “analogy of faith” (1932). [Barth, 1932, 1:1, p. xiii]. The

debate spawned many versions of analogy and the controversy continues today.<sup>6</sup>

The second controversy over analogy emerged later within postmodern phenomenology. A book by French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion with the provocative title *Dieu sans l'être* (God without being), caused an uproar in the early 1980s. For, just as Barth had said Przywara's analogy was invented by the Antichrist, Marion called St. Thomas Aquinas an "idolater" for his doctrine of analogy which he, Marion, felt was an example of the "onto-theo-logy" criticized by Martin Heidegger.

Under attack by Thomists, Marion soon recanted his criticism and developed a more accurate and interesting way of understanding Thomistic analogy.<sup>7</sup> Marion also acquitted Thomas of the charges of onto-theo-logy, pointing out that for the saint *esse commune* (common being) does not include *esse divinum* (divine being). Thomas's analogy, he said, is "apophatic"; instead of "building a bridge" between creation and God, it "digs a gulf" (*gouffre*) between them.<sup>8</sup>

### Analogy for Stein

Edith Stein, for her part, points out that Joseph Gretd's "transcendental" concept of being as being (*ens ut ens*,  $\text{ὄν ᾗ ὄν}$ ) is general enough to include both created and uncreated be-ings", but, she adds,

this is precisely the key question: is it possible – and how is it possible – to form such a concept (that is, to justify it objectively) – a concept that would include both what is created and uncreated? [EES, p. 246; Gretd, 1929, vol. 2, pp. 1ff].

<sup>6</sup> For a description see [Palakeel, 1995]; for continued discussions see [Johnson, 2010]. There appeared a number of kinds of analogies-of: of relation, *nominum* (Barth), *fidei, caritatis* (Hans Urs von Balthasar), of advent (B. Jüngel), of knowing, of having being, of being symbol (K. Rahner).

<sup>7</sup> [Marion, 2002]. Marion's work became available to an English-speaking public after the translation of this material (1991) as well as of the overview by [Janicaud, 2000].

<sup>8</sup> ["Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'onto-théo-logie", p. 43], and [Marion, 2002, p. 297; ST 1:13:7].

And she promises soon to return to this “crucial question”. But as we might expect, her answer is complex, as were those of Barth and Marion.

Stein firmly rejects univocity; analogy she describes as an “infinite gulf” (*Kluft*) between creature and God. [EES, p. 244]. She sums up St. Thomas’s doctrine in *Finite and Eternal Being* with almost the same words that she used in her previous work, *Potency and Act*:

Thomas’s entire system of basic concepts is bisected by a radical dividing line that splits each, beginning with being, into two faces, one turned here below and the other pointing beyond: nothing can be said in the same sense of God and creatures. And we may use the same expressions for both only because these terms have neither a single sense (univocal) nor two different senses (equivocal) but stand in a relation of *agreement* (analogous). We could, then, call the dividing line itself the “*analogia entis*” to designate the relation of God and creature.<sup>9</sup>

Stein, then, is working within the Thomistic tradition of analogy. On the other hand, Duns Scotus held a version of the univocal theory. When we say that both Socrates and God are wise, he explained, “wisdom” has the same sense; however it is true of God in an infinite way and of Socrates in a finite way. In *Finite and Eternal Being* Stein follows Scotus on a number of points rather than Aristotle or Aquinas, but she does not mention him when speaking of analogy.<sup>10</sup> She does, however, use the notion of finiteness in her description of analogy.

### ***Proportionalitas* in Aquinas and Stein**

Aquinas, in his early work, *De veritate* (which Stein translated into German), spoke of two kinds of analogy, of “agreement according to

<sup>9</sup> [PA, pp. 9-10 (English 7-8), EES, pp. 9-10]. Stein discusses analogy in [EES, pp. 10, 268, 288-302] and in [PA, pp. 90, 151, 278ff (English 128, 218, 406ff)].

<sup>10</sup> [EES, pp. 96, 346ff; see quote on the page 3].

a proportion”,<sup>11</sup> which have been explained in many ways in the history of scholasticism. One kind, the analogy of proportionality (*proportionalitas*), involves a proportion (a:b = c:d); the other kind, which does not, is often called the “analogy of attribution” [*De veritate*, 2:11].

Stein argued against Gredt’s interpretation of the analogy of proportionality:

God’s being is the act of His essence as the creature’s being is the act of its essence.

Her basic reason for rejecting this statement is that since “essence” and “being” have different senses in God and creature, there is no “equality of relations”.<sup>12</sup> Gredt’s interpretation has become a common way of stating Thomas’s idea of analogy, but Thomas himself seems to have abandoned the analogy of proportionality in his later works.<sup>13</sup>

Stein does however, admit Gredt’s proportion

*esse* is to *essentia* (being is to essence) as act is to potency,

and suggests, speaking of Seneca’s distaste for the Latin word “*essentia*”, that the relation of *esse* to *essentia* would go better in Middle High German, where the verb “*wesen*” (like “*sîn*”) meant *to be* and the noun *Wesen* (like modern German) means *essence*; so we would have:

*esse* is to *essentia* as *wesen* is to *Wesen*”.

More importantly, Stein applies the notion of proportion to her theory of “essentialities”, key element in Stein’s ontology (see below).

### Principle and cause

St. Thomas stresses that to say God is wise conveys more than that He is not unwise or that He causes Socrates’s wisdom, for Thomas, like Edith

<sup>11</sup> *Convenientia secundum proportionem; Übereinstimmung gemäss einem Verhältnis* in Stein’s translation, [EES, p. 289].

<sup>12</sup> *Verhältnisleichheit*, [EES, p. 290].

<sup>13</sup> Cf. [Copleston, 1962, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 74-75].

Stein, wishes to focus on the *meaning* itself. But God cannot be called wise if the meaning is exactly the same as Socrates being wise or if it is totally different. Thomas quickly disposes of “equivocity”, for to use words of God and creatures in different senses, he says, is the “fallacy of equivocation”, tantamount to agnosticism.

Then in his rejection of univocity (that we cannot use words in the same sense of God and creatures), he notes that when an effect falls short of its cause (as when God causes Socrates to be wise in some sense) there will be no likeness “according to the same reckoning (*ratio*) but in a deficient way”. Wisdom said of God and of the wise person differ because in God wisdom is one with His essence and being, but the Socrates’s wisdom is so to speak “shrunk to size” (*circumscriptum* and *comprehensum*) and differs from his essence and being as well as from his varied ability to function [ST, 1:13:4, 1:13:5].

Analogy for Thomas means essentially that perfections *exist beforehand* (“pre-exist”) in God, that God *has them beforehand* (“pre-has” them): has them (timelessly) “before” creatures have them (timefully). All perfections are found in God

since the effect pre-exists virtually in the cause effecting it, [ST, 1:4:2]

and so

whatever goodness we claim to be in creatures pre-exists in God, indeed in a higher way [ST,1:13:2].

Thomas also said that things are “true” as they are “pre-conceived” by the divine intellect and

attain the likeness of their species, which are in the divine mind.<sup>14</sup>

Thomas is borrowing terms here (*praeexistere* and *praehaberi* = προεῖναι and προέχεσθαι) from Dionysius the Areopagite’s treatise on the divine names; whom he quotes several times in this context, as for example:

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<sup>14</sup> So-called “ontological truth”, cf. [EES, p. 256, ST, 1:16:1].



God also has all existing things beforehand in one.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, since we can speak of God only starting from creatures,

all we say of God and creatures is based upon a relation of creatures to God as to the source and cause (*principium, causa*) wherein all the perfections of things pre-exist in a higher way.<sup>16</sup>

For Thomas, “God is good” does not *mean* “God causes goodness” but “what we call goodness in creatures pre-exists in God”, but also “since He is good, He spreads goodness to creatures” [ST, 1:13:2].

There is indeed a strong apophatic element in Thomas’s theory, for when we say that God is alive, we do not mean

that life comes from Him; we are rather signifying the very source of things inasmuch as life pre-exists in Him, but in a higher way than we understand or signify [ST 1:13: 2 ad 2].

We do not know what living is in God any more than we know what He is or how He is – His essence and being, with which His living is identified. A thread of meaning, a relation whose term is unknown to us, extends from creature to God. St. Thomas, then, borrows from each horn of the dilemma: “living” is alike in God and creature but not in the *same* reckoning since it is “higher” in God, and so unknown to us, but “deficient” in creatures.

## Two traditions

Analogy in a wide sense, for Thomas, involves two asymmetric relations from creature to God as the *source* of the meaningfulness that *exists* in the creature and *pre-exists* in God, and to God as the *cause* that brings the creature about in its meaningfulness and keeps it about. There are two “causal” traditions here – “Platonic” and “Aristotelian” –: God is both the *causa exemplaris* of the creature, the *source* of its meaningfulness, and its *causa efficiens*, its *cause (tout court)* of its entire actuality. The source

<sup>15</sup> “ἐν ἐνὶ γάρ [...] τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ προέχει”, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5; “Deus in uno existentia omnia praehabet”, [ST, 1:4:2 sed contra].


<sup>16</sup> [ST, 1:13:5, see ST, 1:13:1].

relation, found in the Church Fathers, is the Platonic μίμησις and μέθεξις, *imitari* and *participari*: being-a-likeness-of and having-a-share-in.

This twofold relation recalls the scholastic discussion of *ideatio* and *creatio*. The former belongs to the “exemplarist” tradition of Augustine, Bonaventure and of Thomas himself. *Ideatio* is God conscious of Himself, knowing Himself as *imitabilis ad extra*, as it were “copiable outside” Himself in a created world. It is Thomas’s *ars divina*, divine craft, which Stein translates as “the divine plan of creation” (Bonaventure calls it “the ageless craft” (*ars aeterna*).<sup>17</sup>

The relation to source – imitating and sharing – goes from creatures to God’s self-awareness, to His mind. The relation to cause, *creari*, being-made-to-be at God’s choosing, goes from creatures to God’s freedom to His will.

For Thomas, when I say “Socrates is good” this is “all I mean”, but I can only say “God is good” with respect to good creatures like Socrates, for creatures are the starting point for all I say of God [ST, 1:13:6, 3]. “God is good” with respect, say, to Socrates being good, entails that Socrates’s goodness is already had, already conceived, by God, already exists in God timelessly as *source (causa exemplaris)*, which I cannot know in my present life. It also connotes that God, as the *cause (causa efficiens)*, actualizes Socrates timefully in his, Socrates’s goodness. An illustration:



<sup>17</sup> [EES, p. 107; quoting *De Veritate*, 2:5. Bonaventure, 3:3].

### Stein on analogy

Stein's view of analogy reflects these Thomistic elements. Analogy for her, as for Thomas, involves an "agreement" (*Übereinstimmung* – *convenientia*) of a creature with God, a *relation* (*Verhältnis, Beziehung* – *ordo, proportio, relatio, habitudo*). Stein stresses the relation between an image, likeness, "copy" (*Abbild*) and its archetype, "original" (*Urbild*), where the creature "imitates" the archetype and "shares" in it (*nachbilden* – *teilhaben*). She quotes the Fourth Lateran Council: though the image is "like" its archetype, it is much more "unlike" it.

Stein's view of analogy is also "apophatic"; she cautions that we have no insight into something whose being is its essence. All we can say is that "everything finite – both *what* it is and its being – must be "already-patterned-after", "pre-figured-in", God, "already-sketched-out-in" Him (*vorbilden, vorzeichnen*), since both derive from Him" – this position recalls Thomas's Dionysian notion of "*praeexistere*" and "*praehaberi*".

One of Stein's descriptions of analogy seems puzzling at first: that analogy is the infinite gulf between a be-ing that is "something but not everything" (a created thing) and "the be-ing that is everything" (God) [EES 244]. "Finite" (*endlich*) for Stein means *limited* in two senses: in time and as an object. What is finite in time ends; what is eternal does not; a finite object, since it changes over time, is, *objectively*, now some-this and now some-that; the changeless eternal is everything all at once.<sup>18</sup>

Her view recalls Thomas's distinction between a perfection in God identified with His being and the perfection in a creature that differs from its being, essence and functioning. The distinction also goes back to Dionysius, whose words Thomas quotes in support of his own view that every perfection must pre-exist in the Pre-existent (ὁ πρόωv) Who

is neither this nor that [...]; but rather, as the cause of everything, he is everything.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> [PA, p. 282]; pure being is all it can be, it is pure act, measureless, pure light having nothing closed, unfolded; see also [EES, p. 62].

<sup>19</sup> [*De divinis nominibus* 5, ST, 1:14:2]. Marion has recently developed a concept somewhat allied with this "everything" concept: the "saturated phenomenon" that swamps its concept.

### Essentialities and proportionality

Stein uses the notion of *essentialities* (*Wesenheiten*), the middleground between creation and the Creator, to interpret analogical relations of image to archetype or of “only-something” to “everything”. Essentialities are “meanings”, like Plato’s “ideas” (οὐσίαι), but Stein prefers

the phenomenological term “essentiality” to the much disputed and ambiguous “idea”.<sup>20</sup>

Now, for plain folks, says Stein, essentialities are weird, and

only a wistful thinker, treading paths far from daily life, will discover that there are things like essentialities at all, and then he will have a hard time getting others to understand what he is talking about [EES, p. 77].

Essentialities also parallel the Scholastic *intelligibilia* (the “understandables”), the *possibilia* (“possible essences or natures”), *quidditates*, “*Washeiten*” (whatnesses), involving the notion of *ideatio*.<sup>21</sup> She uses the example of *joy* to show what she means by “essentiality”. The unit of meaning that is *my joy*, the joy that arises, changes over time, and fades, is finite both objectively and temporally. But *joy as such* is timeless [EES, pp. 113, 63, 99].

Interestingly, Stein uses the notion of analogy of *proportionality* to describe essentialities:

as God’s being belongs to Him, so the *what* [of essentialities] belongs to them,

and she adds that

this is the meaning of the *analogia entis* as proportionality.

That is to say, existence is to God as essence is to an essentiality. She explains that although it is

quite clear that *actual* being belongs to God’s essence just as necessarily as essential being belongs to limited essentialities, [EES, pp. 113, 296]

<sup>20</sup> [EES, pp. 63-64; see EES, p. 113].

<sup>21</sup> [EES, p. 245]. Stein says a study is needed to show how *intelligibilia* are related to the Platonic ideas; [EES, p. 81 note; see pp. 165ff].

essence cannot be reduced to being nor being to essence. Essence and being are rather contained inseparably in God as in the “I am”; essence and being, the kinds of be-ings and their ways of being, first appear separate in the created world. This analogy of proportionality does not, of itself, include created things, and so is not an *analogia entis*, an analogy of “all” being; however, the analogues, God and essentiality, are indeed “one side” of – the basis of – the analogy of all being.

Essentialities, Stein says, have two kinds of being: those understood as “simple ultimate meanings” and essences or “whatnesses” that are incorporated into them – a realm of the Platonic ideas, of the Scholastic intelligibles, structured from the universal down to the particular.<sup>22</sup> Essentialities are not “actual”, they have “not come about” (*ungeworden*); they rather “abide”, timelessly, “at rest”.<sup>23</sup> Something corresponding to essentialities becomes actual in timeful things, whose essential features “imitate them” [EES, pp. 68, 81]. The being of essentialities then parallels St. Thomas’s *source*, but not *cause*. For essentialities, by themselves, are not “effective”, they do not “cause” anything; the finite things related to them are actualized in another way [EES, p. 92].

Stein claims Thomas’s support for these reflections on essential being. He says the whatness (*essentia*) is in the mind of God not as a creature but as a “*creatrix essentia*”, as “creative essentiality” in Stein’s translation.<sup>24</sup> She also quotes Thomas on another point touching on the theory of truth: whatnesses, he says, have two *ways* of being: in finite things and in our minds,

for what the intellect knows must be the same in the thing, yet not in the same way.<sup>25</sup>

An essentiality for Stein is a timeless meaning, indifferent to being “actualized” and “mentalized” [EES, p. 98].


Stein’s views may be illustrated in this way:

<sup>22</sup> [EES, pp. 90-91, 77, 78 and 81 n229].

<sup>23</sup> [EES, pp. 107-108, 100, 92, 81]. Here “abide” renders the same Middle High German verb “*wesen*”.

<sup>24</sup> [*Schöpferische Wesenheit*, EES, p. 89].

<sup>25</sup> [*Commentary on the Metaphysics*, 1:10, EES, p. 95].



### Meaning in the beginning

When we make statements like “God is His divinity, ... His being, ... His living”, Stein says, we are separating what in God is inseparable. It is better to say “God is – God” and be done with it. She means that we cannot characterize His essence as something other than Himself.

Stein calls upon the Scriptures to clarify her view of analogy [EES, p. 293]. When Moses asks God what he should tell the people if they ask His name, God answers “tell them that I-am sent you”.<sup>26</sup> God does not say “tell them that I am being” or “I am the be-ing”, but simply “I am who am”. “I-am” means “I am living”, “I know”, “I will”, “I love”, all in one. Stein thinks that a language that has a single word for “I am” – like the Latin “*sum*” – can better express this oneness; she could also have said “*ʔehyeh*” (אֶהְיֶה), for this is what God said in Hebrew: “*ʔehyeh* sent me to you”.

In beginning of St. John’s Gospel “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος” is ordinarily rendered “in the beginning was the Word”, but Stein likes Faust’s translation:

*im Anfang war der Sinn,*

“in the beginning was Meaning”.<sup>27</sup> Analogy for her ultimately means that

<sup>26</sup> [Exodus 3:14]; Stein refers to St. Augustine see [EES, pp. 46 and 61].

<sup>27</sup> [EES, p. 100; John 1:1; Goethe, *Faust*, 1:1178ff].

created things have their being – indeed their actual being – in the divine Logos, combining *source* of meaning and *cause* of all its being.

“Perfections” are the “analogues” of God in creation. She traces them in the seventh chapter of *Finite and Eternal Being*, beginning with personhood, for God’s very name, “I-am”, conveys that He is being-in-Person. She explains that

our search for the meaning of being has led us to the being that is the originator and archetype of all finite being,

where *Urheber* and *Urbild* recall Thomas’s *causa* and *principium* [EES, p. 302].

### Coherence and constancy

Stein borrows a word from an early Christian hymn, “συνέστηκεν”, which she translates as “having coherence and constancy”.<sup>28</sup> “Coherence” (*Zusammenhang*) means that each thing stands in an array of causal relations to all other things, and its relatedness is determined by its own “private” character. All be-ings are “pre-patterned”, “pre-sketched-out” as a great work of art, Thomas’s “divine craft” – which for any of us is but

a few forlorn notes of a symphony played far away, borne to me on the wind [EES, p. 107].

“Constancy” (*Bestand*) means that all things abide, are *alive*, in the Λόγος, in their being as essentialities. Their meaningfulness, “not come to be”, is “at home” in the Λόγος [EES, p. 107]. But the essentialities, “resting” in themselves, become, through the Λόγος, “effective”, actual, “creative” (as Thomas says) – source and cause, *causa exemplaris* and *causa efficiens*. God “forethinks” (*vorausdenken*) actual being, His mind spans all things possible, whether or not they will ever have become actual; such are

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in [Colossians 1:17; EES, p. 101, note].

the Scholastic *possibilia*. “The finite is in the eternal”, Stein says: all meaningfulness is encompassed by the divine mind and every be-ing has its archetypical and causal ground in the divine essence.

The Logos [...] has a dual countenance: one mirrors the one simple divine essence, the other the manifold of finite be-ing [EES, p. 111].

God then, is

*Nicht nur Herr des Seins, sondern auch des Sinnes,*

“Lord not only of being but also Lord of meaning” [EES, p. 100].

Commenting on Heidegger’s work, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Stein asks whether, as he claims, we must renounce the “arrogance” of wishing to speak of the “being-in-itself” [EES, p. 492]. By recognizing our very “being-but-something”, she answers, we break through to the “everything” – “analogically”: as

*magis ignotum quam notum*

more unknown than known. And here she quotes John of the Cross:

Qué bien sé yo la fonte  
que mana y corre,  
aunque es de noche.

Oh, I know Source,  
welling, running;  
although by night.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> [EES, p. 35; “Cantar de la alma que se huelga de conocer a Dios por fe”. *Obras* 1982, pp. 11-13].



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