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## **Analogy-Refutation-Argumentation. Between the Aristotelian Dialectics and Perelman's Theory of Argumentation**

**ABSTRACT.** In this paper we review how analogy is used for refutatory purposes by Plato, Aristotle and Ch. Perelman. With the above, we want to show that analogy is a fundamental process for any theory of argumentation, and very particularly for any theory of refutation. For this, we follow the ensuing line: first, we analyze how Plato conceives analogy in the *Sophist*, as one of the parts of its dialectical method. Second, we offer two examples of how analogy is used in a refutation process. For this, we discuss the *Meno* of Plato – where the character ‘Socrates’ refutes the character ‘Meno’, using two analogies: Meno himself like an analogy of virtue, and a swarm of bees as an analogy of the confused ideas that Meno has in his mind. Third, we expose the so called ‘rhetorical turn’ about the platonic conception of refutation; this ‘turn’ is given by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, and we review various characteristics of it. Finally, we analyze the function that Perelman assigned to refutation in his argumentation theory. The conclusion of our paper is that analogy is present, and is used, in various theories of argumentation that have been created throughout history.

**KEY WORDS:** analogy, refutation, dialectics, argumentation theory

### **Introduction**

The different theories of argumentation created during the course of the Twentieth Century have as a fundament that the idea of human disagreements can be resolved without violence. In effect, Perelman (1989), Toulmin (2007) and Van Eemeren (2006) purport that their theoretical-methodological proposals are a practical support for the solution of human conflicts. However, these models of argumentation that began from the