

CARLOS R. GUTIÉRREZ RUEDA

Analogy-Refutation-Argumentation. Between the Aristotelian Dialectics and Perelman's Theory of Argumentation

ABSTRACT. In this paper we review how analogy is used for refutatory purposes by Plato, Aristotle and Ch. Perelman. With the above, we want to show that analogy is a fundamental process for any theory of argumentation, and very particularly for any theory of refutation. For this, we follow the ensuing line: first, we analyze how Plato conceives analogy in the *Sophist*, as one of the parts of its dialectical method. Second, we offer two examples of how analogy is used in a refutation process. For this, we discuss the *Meno* of Plato – where the character ‘Socrates’ refutes the character ‘Meno’, using two analogies: Meno himself like an analogy of virtue, and a swarm of bees as an analogy of the confused ideas that Meno has in his mind. Third, we expose the so called ‘rhetorical turn’ about the platonic conception of refutation; this ‘turn’ is given by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*, and we review various characteristics of it. Finally, we analyze the function that Perelman assigned to refutation in his argumentation theory. The conclusion of our paper is that analogy is present, and is used, in various theories of argumentation that have been created throughout history.

KEY WORDS: analogy, refutation, dialectics, argumentation theory

Introduction

The different theories of argumentation created during the course of the Twentieth Century have as a fundament that the idea of human disagreements can be resolved without violence. In effect, Perelman (1989), Toulmin (2007) and Van Eemeren (2006) purport that their theoretical-methodological proposals are a practical support for the solution of human conflicts. However, these models of argumentation that began from the

same fundament are not the first in history. In fact, with the birth of the dialectic, of rhetoric, of logic, in the fourth Century B.C., Plato and Aristotle created an argumentative model with the same intention: the solution of human conflicts.

Having said the above, refutation is one of the processes that is present in any conception of argumentation whose aim could be the solution of conflicts. Such refutation is present in all theories because it discusses a reasoned attack on the arguments that somebody proposes to support his conclusion. And, as we know, the first person in theorizing about this subject was Aristotle in his *Sophistical Refutations*. But, Aristotle himself did not begin to think about such refutation from out of nothing. As we can see in his writings, he found inspiration in writings of his Master, Plato. Setting out from this entire context, we want to ask: do the theories of argumentation that were created during the course of the Twentieth Century, especially the theory of Perelman, just gather up the theoretical elements proposed by Aristotle or do they contribute to the comprehension of the order of the refutation?

To answer our question we will follow the next thesis: that the proposal of the theory of Perelman in his *New Rhetoric* is developed in an original way in comparison with the theoretical proposal that Aristotle gave in his *Rhetoric*. With this, we want to maintain that the contemporary theories of argumentation, even though they take up a lot of Aristotelian elements, in fact, are novel and original approaches of refutation. Furthermore, we believe that it is very important to rescue the analogical process that Plato used in his dialogues as a way to refutation. At the end of my paper, I will develop this idea.

To support my thesis I propose to do the next recourse: first, to review how Plato conceived of refutation as a very important element of dialectics – in the *Sophist*. Secondly, and after reviewing the distinct definitions that Aristotle offers of refutation (in *Sophistical Refutations* and in *Prior Analytics*), we will explain how Aristotle breaks the dialectical context of Plato, carrying refutation to the field of rhetoric. We call this movement “the rhetorical turn” of the refutation. Finally, I will compare this conceptualization with the proposal of Perelman, in his book *The New Rhetoric*.

I want to clarify that this study is not simple because refutation is not an isolated argumentative process; on the contrary, it is related to a lot of processes, as much logical as rhetorical. Also, I want to clarify that this work does not have the intention to offer a definitive version of the problem; quite the first approach to the subject. For the moment, I just want to glimpse some ways that may let us tackle this subject in depth and with clarity.

The refutation in the *Sophist* of Plato: the dialectic perspective

We will begin our seeking of refutation (Lat. *elenchus*) in Plato's dialogues since, as we know, he develops this subject in some of his works (*Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, and *Laws*). But, we will focus our research in the *Sophist* because in this dialogue the refutation not only appears referenced but it is very important in the argumentative process of the dialectics, and it is valued positively from the educational perspective.¹ We will only refer to the others dialogues when it will be necessary to reinforce my exposition. As with all Plato's dialogues, the *Sophist* begins with an introduction in which the setting and the characters who take part in the dialogue are presented. In this case, the physical setting is one of the *agorai* of Athens, and the characters are Theodorus, Socrates, an anonymous stranger, and the young Theaetetus. The character of Theodorus is used only to open the scene and introduce Theaetetus to the anonymous stranger. Once Socrates learns that the stranger is "a real philosopher", and raves in his compliments towards this noble activity,² he asks what distin-

¹ To be outside the objectives of our work, we will not enter into the debate about the place occupied by the Sophist into the *corpus platonium*. Nor will we develop the theme of the relationship of this work with other dialogues. We will assume that it is a sufficiently significant and autonomous unit to be studied individually. And we will only resort to other works when it is necessary to reinforce our argument. See: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/searchresults?q=Parmenides> [trans. Harold N. Fowler].

² Socrates calls the philosophers "superior beings" because they "seem to be refuting gods (Gr. *θεὸς ὧν τις ἐλεγκτικός*) who observe and contradict weak arguments" (216a-b).

guishes the sophist, the politician and the philosopher, all three of which are specialists in discussion (Gr. τὰς ἔριδας ἐσπουδακότων).

In this way, Plato briefly introduces to us the characters and main subject of the dialogue (216a-218a). Plato then (218a-b) describes to us the method through which the characters will seek differences in their proposals. When the stranger becomes tired after giving a long speech before the other Athenians, he proposes speaking through a dialogue consisting of questions and answers; that is to say, he proposes a dialectical practice (Gr. διαλέγεσθαι). Being loyal to his tradition, Socrates refuses his participation in that discussion, so he encourages the stranger to engage in dialogue with the young Theaetetus.

The scene ends with the dialogue: in one of the *agorai* of Athens, a stranger engages in dialogue with a young Athenian seeking the difference among the sophist, the statesman and the philosopher. But why does Plato, the author of the dialogue, leave the character of “the stranger” anonymous? As we will see, leaving this character without identification is an intentional act by Plato; this intentionality will help us understand why the author develops the subject of the refutation in this dialogue.

We start from the point that in the dialogue Plato never lets the reader know the identity of the stranger; however, from the beginning of the *Sophist*, he offers us a very important data for his identification, not to indicate a particular person but to *frame* his dialogue. In fact, in the beginning of the *Sophist* (216a), the author conscientiously affirms the fact that the stranger is “from Elea”.³ We understand that this is not casual information because other natives of the Sicilian city including the philosophers Parmenides and Zeno – elderly men who Plato⁴ distinguishes as members

³ The complete classical greek text says: “[...] καὶ τόνδε τιναζέον ἄγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἐλέας, ἐταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα ἐταίρων, μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον” (216 a). <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/searchresults?q=Parmenides> [trans. Harold N. Fowler].

⁴ Both lived in the late fifth century BC; while Plato was born around 427 BC. This means that Plato was a young man when Parmenides and Zeno were older adults (Plato, *Parmenides*: 127a). There, in addition to relating them as a teacher and disciple, Plato suggests that they were lovers. See also: [Diogenes Laertius, *Life and Works of the Most Illustrious Philosophers* (XI, 505); And Ateneus (XI 505)].

of the Eleatic school of philosophy and strong advocates of “the unity of what is.” This reference to Elea has led many specialists – [Guthrie, 1990] for example – to identify this anonymous character with the Eleatic current in ancient philosophy. In this way, we find the young Theaetetus being questioned by an Eleatic philosopher, not only about his origins, but about his philosophical position and method. This philosophical position and his method for seeking philosophical knowledge is what frames the *Sophist*.

What is the relevance of all of this for the subject of the refutation? I will establish the answer by parts by directing our attention to members of the Eleatic school of philosophy: Parmenides and Zeno. For this, we will visit another platonic dialogue: the *Parmenides*.

First, we know that in his *Poem* (fr. 2, 3)⁵, Parmenides maintained that “It is and it is impossible for anything not to be”, that is to say, he affirms Unity⁶; his pupil Zeno (Plato, the *Parmenides*: 128b) defended the same thesis, but expressed it negatively: “it is not many”, that is to say, he refutes Plurality. And, each one offers “fine and excellent” proofs of his position. We could say that, in general terms, the Eleatic philosophers support with reasons Unity and refute Plurality.

Secondly, as Socrates says in the *Parmenides* (128b), to affirm Unity and refute Plurality is nearly the same thing; in fact, they are like two faces of the same coin. The main difference between them is the “aim” for which Zeno refutes Plurality. In fact, according to him, he does not intend to defend something but, to the contrary, his intention is to attack the adversaries of his master. According to him, his position emerges, (128c), with a “spirit of controversy” (Gr. *φιλονικία*); that is to say: attacking and, at the same time, ridiculing Parmenides, “[...] opposes (Gr. *ἀντιλέγει*) he advocates of the many and gives them back their ridicule with interest, for its purpose is to show that their hypothesis that existences are many, if prop-

⁵ <http://philoctetes.free.fr/parmenidesunicode.htm> [trans. John Burnet].

⁶ Plato explicitly presents the position of Parmenides: “in your poem you say that the one is the whole” (Gr. *ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φηῆς εἶναι τὸ Πᾶν*) (128a). To link this anonymous sophist to the eleatic school, see: 242d.

erly followed up, leads to still more absurd results than the hypothesis that they are one” (128d).⁷

And here, we arrive at a very important point in our study of the refutation. Moreover, we can affirm that this *φιλονικία*, the love of victory by means of polemic discussion, is the motor of the refutation, because it is what leads Zeno to contradict all the other arguments, and to demonstrate that those theses contain contradictions. In a word, Zeno is the creator of the refutation.⁸

We are now ready to return to the *Sophist*. In this dialogue, we understand why Plato leaves one of the characters anonymous. His name is not important, only the method by which he defends his philosophical idea. This way, speaking with *φιλονικία*, is what *frames* both the seeking of differences among the sophist, the politic and the philosopher, and the proposal by Socrates in the beginning of the dialogue.

In this context, the stranger carries on a very long process of questioning and answering (Gr. *διαλέγεσθαι*) with Theaetetus, through which they seek, above all, a definition of the sophist (218b-231b). The method by which they arrive at this division is to begin with a tentative definition, and divide and separate their belonging to different genres and species. With this procedure, the stranger directs the young Theaetetus at the end of all of this exercise to determinate some of the characteristics that belong to the sophist (231d-232b). The stranger and Theaetetus find seven aspects that characterize the sophist, but of all of those, just two of them are of interest to us: a) “an athlete in contests of words (Gr. *τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς⁹ περιλόγους ἢν τις ἀθλητής*); and b) that it is limited to the “art of disputing” (Gr. *τὴν ἐριστικὴν¹⁰ τέχνην ἀφωρισμένως*). In short, the stranger compares the sophist with a disputer (Gr. *ἀντιλογικόν*).

⁷ <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/searchresults?q=Parmenides> [trans. Harold N. Fowler]

⁸ In fact, according to Diogenes Laertius (IX, 25), Aristotle himself considered Zeno as “the father of dialectics”.

⁹ *ἀγών* = Competition, struggle; Lecture, arena; Contention, dispute, litigation, danger.

¹⁰ *ἔρις* = Pendency, quarrel, rivalry.

In this characterization of the sophist proposed by Plato, we can appreciate the sophistic practice of the Zenonian *φιλονικία* as a method of discussion by contradiction (Eristic), that is, opposing an argument with an argument. And this is the context in which one we must locate the first conceptions of the refutation. In effect, the refutation is a very important element in the dialectic discussion, where the thesis is attacked (Gr. *κατηγορία*) and defended (Gr. *ἀπολογία*) (Plato, *Phaedrus* 267a).

An example of refutation using analogy: the *Meno* of Plato

Now, what about the analogy? To close this section about Plato, we would like to point out that the Athenian philosopher used analogy as a very important element of his argumentative processes to, among other things, refute. To illustrate my point of view, I want to focus on one of his dialogues: the *Meno*. As we can remember, this dialogue begins with Meno asking Socrates whether he believed it was possible to teach virtue. Conspicuously, Socrates gives the question back to Meno – a pupil of Gorgias: “I have to reproach myself with an utter ignorance about virtue; and if I do not know what a thing is, how can I know what its nature may be?” (71b).¹¹ To give a better explanation about his point, Plato establishes an analogy between Meno and virtue: if we do not know who is Meno, neither can we know if he is handsome, rich and noble; in the same way, we cannot know if his virtue is teachable until we know what it is.¹² As we can see, analogy is used as means for exemplification, and works by means of clarifying the question. This Socratic intention is not achievable because Meno does not understand the question.

¹¹ <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0178%3Atext%3DMeno%3Asection%3D71a> [trans. W.R.M. Lamb].

¹² In this specific point it is very important to take into account the Greek text, because it appears ‘οἶόν’ that clearly shows that it is an analogy. The full text says: “ἢ δοκεῖ σοιοῖ ὄν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένωνα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστίν, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε καλὸς εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν”.

In a second example about the use of analogy by Plato, Meno defines virtue for the first time. This example is a perfect illustration of how Plato uses analogy to refute Meno. In 71e to 72a, Meno is confused, and instead of defining virtue, he gives some examples of it: he speaks about the virtue of men, women, elderly people, and children. Socrates points out to Meno that exemplifying something is not the same as defining it. He shows this mistake to Meno through his second analogy, in which he compares the examples of virtue that Meno has offered with a swarm (Gr. *σμήνός*) of bees. Socrates ironically establishes the similitude: “I seem to be in a most lucky way, Meno; for in seeking one virtue I have discovered a whole swarm of virtues there in your keeping” (72a). Socrates then establishes how he will use this analogy: “Now, Meno, to follow this figure of a swarm (Gr. *τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν περὶ τὰ σμήνη*), suppose I should ask you what is the real nature of the bee (Gr. *περὶ οὐσίας*), and you replied that there are many different kinds of bees and you tell me that they are a lot of and the all types what do you answer me [...]” (72a-b).¹³

Meno seems to grasp the analogy, because he responds, “they do not differ, the one from the other as bees.” However, when he attempts to relate the idea of a swarm of bees to the virtue, Socrates asks him, “Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike?” (72c),¹⁴ Meno gets stuck and does not know how to answer. While Socrates is clear that “however many and various they may be, they all have one common character whereby they are virtues” (Gr. *κἄν εἰ πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπαὶ εἰσιν, ἔν γέ τι εἶδος ταύτων ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι’ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί*) (*ibidem*). In this last step, Meno’s proposal for defining virtue remains openly refuted, because Meno recognizes that he does grasp what Socrates is aiming at. In effect, in 80a, when Meno compares Socrates to a torpedo fish, he affirms that if it is true that “on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people”, he can now say in front of Socrates what it is.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

In this way, Plato uses refutation by analogy in *Meno* as a means of demonstration. Here we show only a pair of examples of the use of analogy to refute; however, the Platonic dialogues are full of these rhetorical and dialectical resources.

We do not want to close this section without saying that in the *Phaedrus*, Plato offers an example of refutation that Aristotle takes up in his *Rhetoric*. In 273b-c, Socrates explains to Phaedrus that Tisias, also a native of Sicily, was the creator of a persuasive technique that consists in refuting the opponent. He exemplifies it in the following way: if a brave and weak man beats up a strong but cowardly one, and the latter takes the former to court, the coward could refute the strong man by appealing to his weakness, while the strong man could refute the cowardly man by evoking his bravery. In this example, both men are refuted mutually, contradicting one another. From this, Plato deduces that it was Tisias who invented rhetoric.

The Rhetorical Turn in Refutation: Aristotle and rhetoric.

While Plato treats the dialectical discussion procedure as refutation, his treatment is not theoretical because it is nowhere defined. In any case, it falls within the framework of his interest in his struggle to distance himself from the Sophists. In fact, it was his pupil Aristotle who, with a little more maturity, made refutation a central concept within a theoretical framework. To clarify the influence of Plato on Aristotle, it is sufficient to cite the definition of rebuttal Aristotle offers in *Sophistical Refutations* (165a): “refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion”. And a few pages later (168a) is even clearer this influence, “For the same definition ought to hold good of ‘refutation’ too, except that a mention of ‘the contradictory’ (*ἀντίφασις*) is here added: for a refutation is a proof of the contradictory.”¹⁵ And yet, in *Prior Analytics* (66b), he states

¹⁵ http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.1.1.html [trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge].

bluntly: “[...] if what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion, a refutation must take place.”¹⁶

From these quotes, we can deduce two ideas that are central to the Aristotelian conception of refutation: it is an argument and it implies a contradiction in the conclusion. Beyond that, Aristotle offers a clear definition of refutation, making a theoretical move that makes it clear: he brings the refutation into the framework of dialectics and locates it in rhetoric. This movement is what we call the “rhetorical turn” and that is what we intend to elaborate below.

According to Aristotle, rhetoric (Gr. *rhetoriké téchne*) is “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Rhetoric, 1355b); that is, it is the study of the mechanisms that we use to persuade because “all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others” (Rhetoric, 1354a).¹⁷

In this order of ideas, according to Aristotle, rhetoric gives us tools to persuasively argue a thesis or attack an opponent. However, according to Rocionero (1999), [the translator of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* into Spanish], Aristotle uses the term ‘persuasion’ (Gr. *πίστις*) in two very different ways; it can mean: a) “subjective persuasion”; or b) the means to produce this persuasion. Here we are concerned with the second sense, as Aristotle uses it to refer to statements that are compelling and probative. Yet, they are not probative in the sense of formal (analytical) logic, but in the sense of persuasion. And, indeed, the probative nature of persuasion (*apodeixis*) is seen in those forms of argument that Aristotle calls “enthymemes” (1355a). That is, an enthymeme is a rhetorical argument with which we persuade demonstratively (*apodeixis*), either to defend our position or to attack an opponent.

Here, the obvious question that we can raise with the Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is: how can we persuade demonstratively? Without any intentions to offer a comprehensive response – because *Rhetoric* as a whole explicitly answers this question – we would respond that, for Aristotle, we persuade

¹⁶ <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/prior.html> [trans. A. J. Jenkinson].

¹⁷ <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html> [trans. W. R. Roberts].

“through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth” (1356a). By introducing the possibility of persuading demonstratively from what appears to be true (Gr. *εἰκός*), or what is plausible, Aristotle introduces to rhetoric a dialectical scope and brings this into the field of rhetoric. From this point of view, when Aristotle speaks of verisimilitude as a basis for entimematic demonstration, he passes over the pursuit of truth, and proposes discussion as a discipline, where what matters most is simply to discuss. To support our claims, we quote Aristotle himself: “It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be 'necessary', will most of them be only usually true. Now, the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities (Gr. *εἰκός*) and Signs (Gr. *σημείον*), which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true” (1357a).¹⁸

Pursuing this line of reasoning, Aristotle suggests that which is probable (Gr. *εἰκός*) is that which generally happens; that is, the opposite of a necessity (1357a). When things, that may be other than they are, is possible to prove and/or disprove any statement that someone holding. Thus, the **refutation** is a rhetorical exercise, where we offer persuasive proofs, beginning with enthymemes since they are probable (1355a).

It is not until the second book of *Rhetoric* that Aristotle takes up the theme of the refutation. Indeed, in 1396b, the philosopher returns to the theme of enthymemes while discussing rhetorical arguments. Here he offers a new classification: “there are two kinds of enthymemes. One kind proves some affirmative or negative proposition; the other kind disproves one”. He immediately defines the *refutative enthymeme* as “the conjunction of incompatible propositions” (1397a).

As will be noted, Aristotle maintains the dialectical sense of refutation given by Plato and already discussed here: “a proof of the contradictory”. However, he goes a step further in his conceptualization to join this action to the concept of probability. With this move, as we have already indicated, refutation becomes rhetoric. This movement is so important that he

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

devoted the rest of Book II of his work to showing methods of refutation: for example, he lists the following: inflections, the correlative, the most and least, what we say in time, what I said against oneself, definition, etc. however, this subject will not be develop further here.

Refutation in the New Rhetoric of Perelman

In 1958, Perelman published his *Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique* (*The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*), which caught the attention of the academic world and pointed to the fact that it was a mistake to abandon rhetoric, and that it could be used to rationally resolve conflicts between humans. In the book, Perelman proposed that the rhetorical elements of the Greco-Roman tradition could be reclaimed and used to develop a new rhetoric.

In fact, Perelman begins his *Treatise* proposing a break with the Cartesian “ratio”. This rupture is fundamental to understanding Perelman’s motivations. In *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Lat. *Meditationes de prima philosophia*), Descartes created a metaphysical reason, that is, he lifted intellectual reason to the highest level, and proposed it as a substantial metaphysical category. But the reason for this idea was scientific: an idea that could be deduced without allowing any errors, to reach certainties that provided theoretical knowledge. The requirements for considering something to be “true” for Descartes were clarity and distinction. According to the seventeenth-century French philosopher, a proposition is true if I can distinguish clearly that is true. This pristine criterion became the metaphysical basis for the development of scientific knowledge. However, despite its epistemological and technical utility, it leaves out the rational exercise that deals with human problems. This is the great dissatisfaction that motivates to Perelman to create his *new rhetoric*.

To achieve his purposes, Perelman begins by establishing argumentation as one of the tools that allows human beings get into contact with each other, since each of us wants the others to have us in mind; thus, we reason

to have people pay attention to us (Perelman, 1989, 51). For Perelman, argumentation is a vital element of human coexistence.

In this context, Perelman (1989, 91) proposes that argument seek “to provoke or to increase the adherence of men’s minds to the theses that are presented for their assent.” According to this proposal, an effective argument, then, is one that increases the intensity of adherence so that listeners are triggered into the planned action.

This argument is fundamental to our study of refutation, because finding accession implies that one “Pleasers defend, arguing, opposing and sometimes contradictory theses”. As Perelman noted, in the twentieth century, the notion of contradictory opposition in argument, which Plato proposed twenty fifth centuries ago, had to be recovered. However, although there are common elements with tradition, Perelman’s theory of argumentation also has elements that do not appear in traditional theories of refutation. For now, we will discuss only one of them: the “force of argument”. How it is that Perelman uses the force of argument to address refutation?

Perelman developed this notion in the third part of his book. It begins by stating that the argument is not something that happens in isolation. In fact, according to him, argumentative exercise, although consisting of discrete parts, cannot be conceived of as something disjointed. Far from it, for Perelman each of the elements of the argument constantly interact with one another. This interaction can occur among: “interaction among the different arguments utterances, interaction between those and the argumentative situation, between those and his conclusion, and finally, interaction between the discourse contents and those that have the last object.” (Perelman, 1989, 699). These relationships determine what our author calls “amplitude”, the “order” of the arguments and the **“strength” of the argument**. The force of the argument is what guides the argumentative effort, because when we argue it is an effort to gain the support of the listener. This notion is especially important because it is the *refutatory* effort that guides the speaker:

Any refutation –whether of an admitted thesis, an argument not expressed, an objection to an argument– implies the attribution to what is rejected of a certain force that agrees to the useful application of our effort; It is overestimated that which is

fought to give importance to the refutation, make it worthy of taking it into consideration, and this not only with a view to the prestige, but also in order to attract the attention of the audience [p. 713].

We have talked about what guides the rebuttal and what leads to a successful conclusion. Perelman discusses the evaluation of force as that which allows us to overestimate the argument and make the refutation sufficient.

To conclude our work, we want to mention that this is not the only contribution to the Perelman's theory of rebuttal with respect to Aristotle. Indeed, here we have outlined only the element of "argumentative force"; however, for a full view of Perelman's proposal in reference to refutation, we must also take into account the issue of scope. From this element of cohesive argument, Perelman established the processes that help the speaker prevent refutation. However, to avoid this, Perelman established features of the concept that do not appear in Aristotle. This element should be addressed in future research in an effort to give a full account of how Perelman conceives of refutation.

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Carlos R. Gutiérrez Rueda
Universidad Autónoma de Tlaxcala
ruedac@hotmail.com